A Critique of the EPWP Infrastructure Sector (Parts 1 to 3)

CPD Points: 0.5

The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) is a component of the South African government’s response to the triple challenge of poverty, unemployment and inequality. Work provides an income and contributes to personal dignity. The Infrastructure Sector comprises nearly 80% of expenditure on the EPWP.
Conceptualisation of the EPWP was partly based on large-scale, long-term programmes established elsewhere in
sub-Saharan Africa during the 1970s to 1990s. The use of modern labour-intensive methods lay at the core of those programmes.
On conventional capital-intensive construction, labourintensity is usually far below 10% of site-construction expenditure. By contrast, engineers re-engineered product and process to obtain a 30% to 65% site expenditure on productive employment, without compromising time, cost and quality (once systems were established). The range of labour-intensity varied according to the category of construction. In other words, by comparison with conventional construction, the use of modern labour-intensive methods increased the employment generated by 300% to 650%. This was not achieved by superficial tinkering.
Following the re-engineering of product and process an alternative socio-technical system of construction was established – programmes of construction and maintenance were established with direct links to training, in particular ‘hands-on’ single- and multi-site supervisors.
In a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including Kenya,
Botswana and Lesotho, modern labour-intensive methods of construction have been promoted on a large scale over the long term in order to generate skills and employment during the provision of public infrastructure. This has been achieved without compromising time, cost and quality. Thousands of skilled ‘hands-on’ single- and multi-site supervisors have been trained, hundreds of thousands of years of employment have been generated and thousands of kilometres of rural roads have been constructed and maintained. For every kilometre constructed, permanent employment on maintenance was generated.

During the first two phases of the EPWP (2004/05 to 2013/14) the Infrastructure Sector of the EPWP failed to achieve the levels of labour-intensity anticipated in its formulation. The extent of the failure may be judged by the following: labour-intensity has remained stubbornly around 10%, which is barely more than could be achieved using conventional methods.
This series of articles analyses the reasons for this failure. In order to do so, one first has to provide a framework for assessment based upon the theory, principles, research and large-scale practice over the long term, of ‘modern labour-intensive construction’. Furthermore, in South Africa it has been demonstrated that modern labour-intensive methods may be used for high-standard infrastructure.
Having provided a context for a constructive critique, one will then call particular attention to the ways in which the implementation of the EPWP departed from the successful model that was based upon large-scale implementation over the long-term.
In contrast to sub-Saharan programmes, it did not establish a programme of construction of related projects. It did not set up formally linked training programmes to produce large numbers of ‘hands-on’ single- and multi-site supervisors. In particular it did not even establish the Training College to which it was committed in its own original Consolidated Programme Overview and Logical Framework (June 2004). Furthermore it did not establish an ‘in-house’ implementation capacity at local, provincial or national level. Consequently the public sector did not develop an ‘in-house’ capacity to evaluate implementation.
Particular attention will be called to the EPWP’s decision to rely upon independent small contractors and therefore the reliance upon the contract, while largely ignoring the lack of experience or training amongst the target group.
Engineers have a clear role with respect to the physical components of high-quality public infrastructure.

Public funding is being used for the construction and maintenance of public infrastructure. It is reasonable that government should set criteria for the use of public funding. Engineers could play a much greater role in relation to ‘secondary’ socio-economic benefits of public expenditure, in particular skills development and employment creation. Warning: Although there would be a humanitarian component to such an approach, technically sound considerations must be pre-eminent. If the social welfare component is too dominant, engineering considerations are relegated and very little of physical value will be built.
Articulation of an alternative, economically efficient product is complicated by the fact that the existing ‘socio-technical system’ of the construction industry is based upon the use of fuel-powered, heavy equipment. In the face of this, engineers have to perform extensive re-engineering of product and process in order to achieve a technically sound product and socio-economic
objectives. The time, effort and commitment required to execute this task must not be underestimated. Such being the case, it is simpler to introduce radically different techniques through instruction rather than contract. Here, this injunction applies directly to skills development and employment creation. It would also apply to any other of the current ‘buzz words’ such as community participation, small contractor development, sustainability, green building, women’s empowerment and the upskilling of youth. These terms are so easy to add to the list of objectives, but it is very difficult to actually make a significant difference.